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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH
LINES, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,

-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING and JESSE R.
S. BUDGE, COMMISSIONERS OF
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, and DAVID M.
\YELLING, doing business as DAVID
M. WELLING CO.,
Defendants.

Case No. 8942

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACT
This case is before the Supreme Court on a Writ of
Review, directed to the defendants, and for purposes of
reviewing an order of the Public Service Commission of
Utah dated June 18, 1958, which granted to defendant
David M. Welling, doing business as David M. Welling
Company (hereinafter referred to as defendant) Certi-
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2
ficate of Covenience and Necessity No. 1245-Sub 1, embracing operating rights hereinafter set forth.
Defendant Welling's application was filed June 2,
1958, and notice thereof given. However, the application
was so defective that the scope of the authority sought
could not be determined therefrom. Thus at the outset of
the hearing, without further notice, defendant's application was substantially amended to clarify the nature and
extent of the authority requested (Tr. 5 to 16). As
amended the application requests authority "to transport
airplane passengers and their baggage from the Hotel
Ben Lomond in Ogden, Utah, Hill Field Main Gate, Naval
Supply Base l\ifain Gate, Roy, Sunset, Clearfield, Kaysville, and Layton, on the one hand, and Salt Lake City
Municipal Airport, on the other hand, also, from Brigham
City and Perry, on the one hand, and Salt Lake City
Municipal Airport, on the other hand, both of said services to include a return frmn said airport to said points
and places above named; the transportation from and to
Brigham City to be limited to one trip per day." ('Tr.100).
The Conrmission granted authority identical to that outlined in the amended application (Tr. 102). Authority
heretofore held by defendant "\Yelling is outlined in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1245 granted
July 18, 1957 (Tr.105). Under such former grant defendant received authority to transport airplane passengers
and their baggage frmn the Ben Lonwnd Hotel in Ogden,
to the Salt Lake City Municipal Airport, and frmn said
airport to said Ben Lornond Hotel, 01nitting any interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nwdiate service between said points and limited to four
trips per day to and from said airport (Tr. 108).
Hearing before the Commission was held on June 11,
1958, upon application filed June 2, 1958, and the Report
and Order was issued June 18, 1958. A total of seven protestants filed appearances (Tr.1). Mr. David M. Welling
appeared as the sole witness for defendant and testified
as to the present and proposed operation ( Tr. 16-51). The
operation presently conducted by defendant Welling commendced pursuant to certificate No. 1245 the last week of
July, 1957 (Tr. 16). For a period of three months defendant Welling operated on schedule (Tr. 39), but on
November 1, 1957 was forced by financial necessity to reduce his operations to the point of operating only 50%
of his schedules (Tr. 40). From November 1, 1957 to the
present time, defendant has continued to run only 50%
of his schedules and on several days in this period no
trips at all were operated (Tr. 16).
Defendant Welling does not propose to add any
equipment or drivers, but merely seeks for himself an additional source of revenue in the hope of making his operation economically sound (Tr. 44). In his current operation substantial losses have resulted (Tr. 43). Gross
revenue for the period of July, 1957, to December, 1957,
amounted to $2,613.00, while expenditures for that same
period totaled $5,064.41, resulting in a net operating loss
of $2,451.39 (Tr. 42-43). Notwithstanding the admission
of his inability to maintain his runs as scheduled and the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
fact that he is unable to operate without a substantial
loss, defendant Welling proposes to conduct the new
operation in generally the same manner as he has the
former (Tr. 45). It should be noted that with respect to
the financial loss suffered by defendant there was an
allusion made to a strike by the employees of Western
Airlines, indicating that this was the cause or at least a
substantial cause of the failure of defendant's operation
to show a profit (Tr. 49). However, the strike referred
to occurred some time after the figures for 1957 were
compiled and had no affect whatsoever upon the operating
loss of $2,451.39 shown in defendant's statement of December 31, 1957 (Tr. 49). Further inquiry by counsel into
the financial aspects of defendant's operation was not
permitted, even though on its face the business was shown
to make no economic sense (Tr. 49). The relevance of this
material was pointed out, but inquiry still refused by
the Examiner (Tr. 49-50). Information on this point
would seern necessary to any intelligent determination of
the feasibility of defendant's proposed operation.
A number of obvious difficulties present themselves
with reference to the proposed schedule advanced by applicant in this matter (Tr. 79). These will be considered
in greater detail in the argument, but it is evident, even
in the face of defendant's avowed intention of running
a schedule to meet a single passenger, that, with the alternative tin1es allowed defendant on six of the seven proposed schedules ( Tr. 79), 1nany long and tedious waiting
periods at the airport by passengers will result.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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No passenger witnesses were produced by defendant
even though defendant Welling claimed requests for his
service, particularly from Hill Air Force Base and the
Thiokol Plant near Brigham City. Notwithstanding the
alleged urgency of these requests as testified to by defendant over objection of protestant (Tr. 20), neither
installation was sufficiently concerned to send representatives to the hearing. In fact, the record affirmatively
shows that Hill Ar Force Base provides its own transportation to and from the Salt Lake Airport, operating
24 hours a day (Tr. 19).
The operating testimony of plaintiff's witnesses,
Alma C. Johnson, shows Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines,
Inc., is operating under Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity numbers 288 and 545, which authorize plaintiff to transport passengers, baggage and express between Salt Lake City and all points mentioned in this
application except Brigham City and the Main Gate and
the Naval Supply Depot (Tr. 58), (although plaintiff's
buses operate past the east gate on U.S. 91), and plaintiff is currently operating a number of schedules each day
to all points authorized (Tr. 58). The buses run by plaintiff on its schedules are at present carrying on the average only a 50% passenger load (Tr. 60). Plaintiff has
terminal facilities available downtown in Ogden (Tr. 61),
and in the Salt Lake City business district (Tr. 61). Cab
service is available at all times at both the Ogden and
Salt Lake terminals (Tr. 61), and meets existing schedules.
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In 1957 for a period of three weeks plaintiff conducted a limousine service similar to that now proposed
by defendant, from Ogden and intermediate points to
the Salt Lake Airport ('Tr. 62). Plaintiff held itself available to pick up and deliver passengers to all points concerned in this application between the Salt Lake Airport
and Ogden (Tr. 63). The operation had to be discontinued
however, since so few people requested the service that
it was not economically possible to continue (Tr. 64). In
fact, from the intermediate points between Ogden and the
airport, including points for which authority is here
sought, no passengers were carried in the three weeks
of operation (Tr. 63). Plaintiff at the present time still
holds the authority to conduct this proposed operation,
however, further study has indicated that at this time
such operation still is not financially feasible (Tr. 66).
Plaintiff stands ready at any tune and now possesses
adequate equipment to re-institute this operation if conditions so warrant (Tr. 67). While the last schedule
change adopted by plaintiff offered two additional schedules in the hope of bettering its service to the public (Tr.
69), its business has suffered a drop in revenue of 8%
this year (Tr. 67-68), and a further decline would require
plaintiff to reduce its service (Tr. 68).
Further evidence of the already adequate existing
service in this area and the adverse effect to be realized
from the grant of authority herein was offered by protestant Western Greyhound Line. Greyhound operates
13 daily schedules between Brigham City, Ogden and Salt
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Lake (Tr. 52). As noted by Warren H. Perry, operating
witness for Western Greyhound Lines, this line needs the
present volume of business, and any further inroads
would be detrimental to existing service (Tr. 54). A third
protesting witness, Ray Moss, manager of the Ogden
Cab and Transfer Company, indicated that his company
has suffered a decline of 10 to 11% in its business in
the past few years (Tr. 74), and a further decline would
jeopardize that company's position and ability to continue
operations (Tr. 74). A substantial decrease has been
noted in the Salt Lake business handled by the Ogden
Cab and Transfer Company since defendant commenced
its operation in July, 1957 (Tr. 74). At this time the
cab company averages 15 to 20 trips per month from
Ogden and vicinity to the Salt Lake Airport at a fare of
$10.00 per cab (Tr. 76). Moss testified that cabs from
his company are available for transportation from Ogden
and vicinity to the Salt Lake Airport at all times (Tr.
74).
After the conclusion of the hearing and on June 18,
1958, the Commission issued the Report and Order here
under review. By paragraph seven of the Findings of
Fact the commission found as follows:
"The service proposed by applicant is an improvement over his present operation and as such
will be of benefit to the general public in the areas
sought to be served. Improvements in service
rendered by already certified carriers should be
encouraged, if in the public interest, even though
some detriment may result to other carriers (U.P.
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Motor Freight Co. v. Gallagher Transfer and Storage Co., Wyo. 264 P. 2d 771- I.C:C. v. Parker,
326 U.S. 60), and evidence that the route is not at
present adequately served is not necessary to the
granting of an application for authority to institute an improved service." (Tr. 101).
It is obvious from this that the Commission made no
finding that there was any public need for the proposed
service or that any inadequacy existed in the present
service. In granting this certificate the Commission completely abandoned the established concept of convenience
and necessity and based the grant on the fact that applicant is losing money and offering cheaper rates.
Following issuance of the order herein, plaintiff filed
a detailed petition for rehearing (Tr. 110), which was
denied by the Commission on July 7, 1958 (Tr. 113).
STATEMEN·T OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A ·CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
(A) THE FINDING BY THE COMMISSION THAT THE
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SERVICES NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE GRANTING OF A CERTIFICATE OF
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY IS CONTRARY TO UTAH
LAW, AND THE FINDING OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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(B) THE SERVICE PROPOSED BY THE DEFENDANT
IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENTLY EXISTING SERVICE AS FOUND BY THE COMMISSION BUT IS
AN ENTIRELY NEW SERVICE.
(C) THE EXISTING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
IN THE AREA SOUGHT TO BE SERVED ARE ADEQUATE
TO MEET ALL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC.
POINT II.
THE REAL BASES FOR THE GRANTING OF TI-IIS
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, (1)
THAT IN HIS PRESENT OPERATION DEFENDANT IS
SUFFERING FROM SEVERE FINANCIAL LOSSES AND (2)
THAT DEFENDANT IS OFFERING CHEAPER RATES
THAN THOSE OFFERED BY EXISTING CARRIERS, ARE
UNAUTHORIZED AND CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, WHICH
REQUIRES A FINDING BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY.
POINT III.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WILL DIRECTLY
AND ADVERSELY AFFECT PLAINTIFF AND OTHER
EXISTING CARRIERS BY DIVERTING VITALLY NEEDED
TRAFFIC FROM THEIR LINES.
POINT IV.
THE COMMISSION HAS MADE FINDINGS OF FACT
BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO
UTAH LAW WHICH REQUIRES THE FINDINGS OF THE
COMMISSION TO BE BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A .CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
(A) THE FINDING BY THE COMMISSION THAT THE
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SERVICES NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE GRANTING OF A ·CERTIFICATE OF
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY IS CONTRARY TO UTAH
LAW, AND THE FINDING OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE.

In finding that evidence of the adequacy of existing
facilities need not he considered hy the Public Service
Commission in granting a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity ( Tr. 101) the Commission completely ignoreti
both the controlling Utah statute and Utah case law.
Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. (1953) provides:
"If the Cornn1ission finds from the evidence
that the public convenience and necessity require
the proposed service or any part thereof it may
issue the certificate as prayed for ... otherwise
such certificate shall he denied. Before granting
a certificate to a co1n1non n1otor carrier the Commission shall take into eonsideration the financial
ability of the applicant to properly perform the
service sought under the certificate and also th~
character of the highway over which said common
carrier proposes to operate and the effect thereon,
and upon the traveling public using the same,
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and also the existing transportation facilities in
the area proposed to be served."
In construing this section the Utah Supreme Court
in Ashworth Transfer Company v. Publi'c Service Commission, 268 P. (2d) 990 (1954) said that while a finding
of total inadequacy was not necessary, the Commission
was required to consider the existing transportation
facilities in the area before issuing a Certificate. Dealing
again with this specific point the Utah court said in
the case of Mulcahy v. Public Service CommissiJon, 117
P. (2d) 298, 300 (1949). "It is a definite need of the
public where no reasonably adequate service exists." Further, at page 301 the court stated, "If existing services
are rendering adequate service, ordinarily a certificate
will not be granted putting a new competitor in the field."
The action of the Commission in granting the certificate
at issue here is directly contrary to the clearly expressed
requirements of Utah law.

•

Rather than apply Utah law, the Commission here
looked to the Wyoming case of Union Pacific Motor
Freight Co. v. Gallagher Transfer and Storage Co., 264
P. (2d) 771 (1954), and the federal case of I.C.C. v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 (1945). However, both of these cases
were decided under statutes substantially different on
this point from the Utah statute. Neither statute contains
the specific mandate found in the Utah Code that consideration must be given to the adequacy of existing services. The Commission is grasping at straws in relying
on the Union Pacific and Parker cases, as neither has the
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slightest application here. The facts are in no way analagous, as will be shown, and the statute governing the
decisions are completely different. The only possible
application is the statement of the United States Supreme Court in the Parker case, supra at page 64, that to
be valid the findings of the Commission must be based on
the proper statutory criteria. The Commission totally
failed to apply the Utah statutory criteria.
While in its conclusion (Tr. 102) the Commission
stated that public convenience and necessity justifies the
granting of the certificate, not an iota of evidence was
introduced which would support this conclusion. In its
nature the concept of finding that public convenience and
necessity exist is dependent~ as an essential element, upon
the inadequacy of the services being performed by existing carriers. As will be shown, the evidence overwhelmingly shows the total absence of any need for new service.
It is apparent that the Commission's conclusion that publice convenience and necessity justify the grant is entirely without foundation.
(B) THE SERVICE PROPOSED BY THE DEFENDANT
IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENTLY EXISTING SERVICE AS FOUND BY THE ·COMMISSION BUT IS
AN ENTIRELY NEW SERVICE.

As has been shown, the Connnission erred in concluding that the adequacy of existing service need not be
considered in the granting of a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity. It is also readily apparent that the Comrnission was in error in finding that a new service was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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involved here. In paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact
(Tr. 101), the Com1nission found that the proposed service was not a new service but merely an improvement of
the present operation. It tacitly accepted the fact that
the evidence was inadequate to support the grant and
atten1pted to reach for some other approach, here that
this is not a r11atter of new service at all.
Defendant's present service consists of transporting
passengers from the Ben Lomond Hotel in Ogden to the
Salt Lake Airport and return. No service whatsoever is
rendered to any intermediate points, and no service is
extended to Brigham City (Tr. 108). Under the proposed
operation defendant will serve the points of Hill Field
Main Gate, Naval Supply Depot Main Gate, Roy, Sunset,
Clearfield, Kaysville, Layton, Brigham City and Perry,
none of which are now served by applicant (Tr. 102). By
no stretch of the imagination can this be called an improvement of an existing service, and it constitutes
nothing more or less than a new service to points not
heretofore served. Indeed the very cases cited by the
Commission in paragraph 7 of its Report and Order
recognize that where service is extended to points not
previously served, such service constitutes a new service
and not merely an improvement of an existing service.
See Union Pacific Motor Fre~ght Co. v. Gallagher Transfer and Storage Company, supra, and 1.0.0. v. Parker,
supra.
In both cases the courts noted that the grant of authority was limited to points already served by the ap-
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plicant. In the Union Pacific case, supra, at page 775,
the Wyoming court cited the Report and Order of the
Wyoming Public Service Commission which said in holding a new service was not involved, "The Union Pacific
Motor Freight Company is not seeking to serve new
points." Quoting again from the Union Pacific opinion,
the court at page 782 in describing an improved operation
as contrasted with a new one said, "Applicant does not
propose to invade territory of any other carrier. All of
the points or stations are on the rail line which applicant
has served for years."
It is apparent that providing service to new points
1s the essence of the operation proposed by defendant
Welling.
In light of the authorities cited by the Commission
as well as an analysis of the service it is obvious that the
conclusion reached by the Commission, that the proposed
operation is not a new service, is clearly erroneous.
(C) THE EXISTING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
IN THE AREA SOUGHT TO BE SERVED ARE ADEQUATE
TO MEET ALL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC.

The burden of proving that public convenience and
necessity require the grant of a certificate is placed upon
the defendant, and a 1nere sho·wing of convenience or
benefit to the applicant or a few passengers is not a sufficient basis for granting a pennit. See lVycoff Co. v.
Public Serv~ce Comm1:ssi·on, ~:27 P. (2d) 323 (1951). An
exmnination of the transeript shows that applicant totally
failed to discharge this burden.
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No shipper witnesses were presented by applicant.
The total testimony presented by him amounted only to
vague allegations that he had received requests for the
proposed service. Requests for service were reported to
have been received from Hill Air Force Base ( Tr. 19),
but no representative was called from the base to testify
as to these requests or any need for new service. The defendant's own testimony shows that Hill Field in fact
is supplying its own transportation on a 24 hour a day
basis ( Tr. 19). In an attempt to bolster defendant's evidence the Commission found in paragraph 8 of the Report
and Order that the service was needed to Brigham City
for the Thiokol plant, since "the personnel of said company does considerable traveling by air." (Tr. 101). The
record is absolutely barren of any evidence which could
support this conclusion. The only material in the testimony concerning any requests by the Thiokol plant is
found at page 27 of the transcript. There defendant
\V elling testified as to the Brigham City run as follows :
"Yes; that trip has been requested by the Thiokol people in Brigham City, and most of their
people go out in the coach flight at midnight... "
Such a statement could not possibly substantiate the
conclusion reached by the Commission that the company
does considerable traveling by air. No mention was made
of how many Thiokol employees travel at all, let alone
by air. No witness from the Thiokol plant was produced
as would be expected if that plant had a need for the proposed service. Defendant Welling was allowed to testify
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as to the existing transportation facilities in the area,
even though on voir dire examination counsel showed
defendant lacked capacity to so testify (Tr. 34-35). Beyond his own vague statements as to requests received
applicant offered no evidence of any need for his service.
The only evidence produced by defendant Welling was
that he is operating at a considerable loss and is offering cheaper service. It is incredible that a certificate could
be granted upon such a showing.
Alma C. Johnson, operating witness for plaintiff,
testified that plaintiff serves all points concerned in the
application except Brigham City and the Main Gate of the
Naval Supply Base (Tr. 58), although plaintiff's service runs adjacent to the Naval Supply Base (Tr. 58).
Plaintiff provides 14 schedules per day each way to the
points involved herein, and provides additional schedules
to Kaysville (Tr. 59). Space is always available on Lake
Shore's buses which on the average are running only 50%
loaded in this area (Tr. 59, 60). Extra equipment is available to accomn1odate any increase in traffic (Tr. 59).
Plaintiff's buses run fron1 its terminal in the heart
of downtown Salt Lake City to the heart of downtown
Ogden where its terminal facilities are located (Tr. 61).
Cab service is available at all times at each of plaintiff's
terminals to transport passengers to their destinations
(Tr. 61, 62). In 1957 plaintiff engaged in the operation
proposed to be conducted by defendant (Tr. 62). Its experience in this venture conclusively proves there is no
public need for such serviee (Tr. 63). In the three weeks
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advantage of the service. Plaintiff served Ogden and
all intennediate points here involved with direct transportation to and frmn the Salt Lake Airport. Only a fe\v
passengers fron1 the Ogden area were hauled and none
from the intermediate areas (Tr. 63). The Commission's
lack of attention to the evidence presented at the hearing
is graphically shown by the totally erroneous fact finding
concerning this operation. The Commission in paragraph
6 of its Report and Order found that the Ogden Cab and
Transfer Company conducted this service and made no
atten1pt to advertise the service (Tr. 101). As a matter
of fact, as the transcript clearly shows upon even a casual
perusal, it was Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc., which
operated the service ( Tr. 62, 63) and the service was advertised through the airlines and information disseminated to all ticket agents in the area (Tr. 65, 66).
Plaintiff still holds authority to render this service and
has continued to study the situation (Tr. 66). While
plaintiff stands ready to re-institute the service if conditions warrant, such change in demand has not occurred
(Tr. 67). To accommodate passengers who desire to
travel to Salt Lake between the hours of midnight and
6:00 a.m., plaintiff's tickets are honored by the Western
Greyhound Lines which operates runs during those hours.
Evidence presented by other protestants add to the
evidence that existing services are adequate. Western
Greyhound Lines, which serves Brigham City and Ogden
to and from Salt Lake City, provides 13 schedules per
day each way, an average of one run every two hours
(Tr. 52). The Ogden Cab and Transfer Co. provides
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cab service from Ogden and vicinity to the Salt Lake
Airport and return (Tr. 74). This company has cabs
available at all times ( Tr. 74) and has been making 15
to 20 trips per month from Ogden to the Salt Lake Airport (Tr. 76).
Considering the facilities now available, it is apparent that faster service is accorded to passengers at
the present than would be the case under the proposed
operation. An Ogden passenger arriving at the Salt Lake
Airport now can immediately get a cab at the airport
terminal, alight from the cab at the Salt Lake terminal
of Lakeshore Motor Lines and within a short time be
on his way to Ogden aboard one of Lakeshore's 14 daily
schedules. Arriving at Lakeshore's terminal in downtown
Ogden he n1ay immediately take a cab from the terminal
to his home (Tr. 61, 59, Ex. 5, Tr. 88, 62). Compare this
with the plight of a passenger using defendant's proposed service who arrives by air in Salt Lake at 6:30
a.m. on a n1orning when defendant's rnorning run was
made to accmnrnodate a passenger arriving in Salt Lake
at 5:30 a.n1. 'rhe later passenger rnust then wait at the
airport until schedule nurnber two arrives· in Salt Lake
at either 10 :20 or 11 :30, depending on reservations. He
then rides back to Ogden where he is discharged at the
Ben Lomond Hotel and takes a cab to his home (Ex. 1,
Tr. 46, 79). In another situation a passenger from Ogden
whose flight leaves the Salt Lake Airport at 8:00 a.m.
rnust leave Ogden at -! :30 a.rn., arrive at the Airport at
5 :30 then wait for his flight if defendant has another
passenger leaving Salt Lake at 5:30 (Tr. -!G, 79, Ex. 1).
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Such exmnples could be rnultiplied a number of
tirnes. To illustrate the Con1mission's utter disregard
of the evidence it is noted that defendant's schedules
numbers two and three can't possibly be operated as outlined by defendant (Tr. 79). Welling is operating with
a single limousine, and does not propose to acquire additional equipment. His earliest schedule will arrive back
in Ogden at 11 :20 a.rn. Yet schedule three is supposed
to leave Ogden at 11 :15, five minutes before the limousine
has arrived from Salt Lake (Tr. 79). This discrepancy
appears without allowing time for the discharge and
loading of passengers and baggage. No explanation was
offered as to how this phenomenon was to occur, yet the
Commission approved the operation as scheduled (Tr.
102).
In light of all the above evidence, clearly the only
finding that could be reasonably reached is that there
is no need for any additional service.
POINT II.
THE REAL BASES FOR THE GRANTING OF THIS.
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, (1)
THAT IN HIS PRESENT OPERATION DEFENDANT IS
SUFFERING FROM SEVERE FINANCIAL LOSSES AND (2)
THAT DEFENDANT IS OFFERING CHEAPER RATES
THAN THOSE OFFERED BY EXISTING CARRIERS, ARE
UNAUTHORIZED AND CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, WHICH
REQUIRES A FINDING BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY.
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By paragraph two, three and four of its Report and
Order the Commission found that defendant was suffering serious financial losses in his operation ( Tr. 100)
and that passengers utilizing the services of Lake Shore
and Ogden Cab Company must pay larger fares than
defendant offers (Tr. 100, 101). These findings generally
are in accord with the evidence; in fact the only real
evidence offered by defendant concerned the losses suffered and rates offered. However, the fare per passenger
when traveling via the Ogden Cab and Transfer Company might well in some instances be cheaper than
Welling's. The cost of $10 per cab is shared among the
passengers, while vV elling's charge of $3.00 per passenger is constant. These findings of financial losses and
cheaper service under the law cannot substantiate a grant
of a certificate.
That defendant Welling suffered a loss of $2,451.39
in five months of operation in 1957 (Tr. 43) shows that
the certificate should never have been issued in the first
instance. His gross revenue was $2,613.00, while expenditures amounted to $5,064.41 (Tr. 43). The Commission
made a grave error in allowing defendant to commence
operations in 1957 and should not now attempt to rectify
this forn1er mistake by granting new and additional
authority. The experience of plaintiff in atten1pting to
operate the proposed service a year ago (Tr. 62, 63)
demonstrates that such a run is not econ01nically feasible.
To allow the certificate for this proposed operation would
c01npound the 1nistake, throwing the burden of the error
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on existing carriers. A policy of the Comnrission of attemptng to cover its mistakes by allowing a dying business to expand operations will ultimately have disastrous
consequences for the whole trucking industry.
Defendant Welling testified that at the previous
hearing on his first application in July, 1957, he stated
that the operation then proposed would produce a profit
(Tr. 40). Yet he was able to operate on schedule for only
three n1onths (Tr. 39) because he was losing money so
fast he couldn't continue (Tr. 26). Since November 1,
1957, defendant has been operating only 50% of his
schedule (Tr. 40). By his own testimony defendant
Welling admitted his current operation was not economically sound and that his motive in asking for this certifcate was to try to make up his losses (Tr. 43). At page
44 of the transcript, he stated:
". . . So the purpose of this hearing is to request
the things that we feel should be done now to make
it economically sound ... "
To attract passengers defendant has set his rates
at a low level even though such rate is clearly noncompensatory ( Tr. 101). As provided in Section 54-6-2
U.C.A. (1953), it is the duty of the Commission to estalish rates, and those now charged by existing carriers
are in accord with the requirements of the Commission.
The action of the Commission in granting authority to
another competitor on the ground that cheaper rates are
to be charged by the new line is a flagrant abuse of its
discretion in light of such authority.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
It is essential to the orderly administration of the
Inotor carrier industry that the law establishing the
basis upon which certificates are granted be followed,
and to do otherwise precipitates a confusion in the industry as to the basis of regulation. Where, as here,
grants of authority are issued with indifference to
statutory requirements, the entire concept of our legislature in regulation is destroyed.
POINT III.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WILL DIRECTLY
AND ADVERSELY AFFECT PLAINTIFF AND OTHER
EXISTING CARRIERS BY DIVERTING VITALLY NEEDED
TRAFFIC FROM THEIR LINES.

The implications of a grant of common carrier authority in an area where such grant will decrease the
business of existing carriers are much more far-reaching
than the reduction in revenue of those carriers. Operating
an efficient transportation service is a costly business
and losses in revenue of necessity n1ust require a reexamination of the schedules and facilities offered to
the public. If revenue decreases to the point where reduction in service Inust be Inade the ultin1ate effect is
that the traveling public n1ust suffer frmn lack of service.
It is this ultimate consequence which renders important
the evidence of the adverse effect a new grant of authority will have on existing carriers. In the findings of
fact (Para. 7, Tr. 101) it is acknowledged that detriment
will result to the other carriers here involved, but the
Commission holds that such detriment could be disregarded (Tr. 101).
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That all the traffic available in this area is vital
to plaintiff and the other carriers is clearly shown in the
evidence. Plaintiff is currently running its schedules to
Ogden only 50% loaded ( Tr. 60). Through the past year
Lakeshore has suffered a drop in revenue of seven to
eight per cent (Tr. 67). As to further decline in revenue
plaintiff's witness Alma C. Johnson testified as follows:

"Q. And what effect, if any, will be produced by a further dilution of your passenger
revenues~ What is that going to do to the Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines~
A. Well, it will tend to aggravate the present
situation, which is that our revenues are declining to the point where we will probably have to
reschedule some of our operations." (Tr. 68).
Testimony from other protesting carriers indicate
the ill effects will follow the granting of this certificate.
Ray E. Moss, operating witness for protestant Ogden
Cab and Transit Company, testified that his company
has suffered a decline of ten to eleven per cent in business in the past few years (Tr. 74), and that a further
decline will jeopardize the company's position (Tr. 74).
That further decline may be anticipated as a result of the
issuance to defendant Welling of this certificate is illustrated by the fact that Ogden Cab and Transit Company has observed a decrease in the number of trips to
Salt Lake since defendant commenced operations in 1957
(Tr. 75). The cab company at this time Inakes 15 to 20
trips per Inonth to the Salt Lake Airport at a fare of $10
per cab (Tr. 76). Loss of this revenue would seriously
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affect its business. Warren H. Perry, operating witness
for Western Greyhound Lines, pointed out that its
recent application for rate increase indicates the bus
lines need to retain the present volume of business and
that any further inroads on this volume would prove
detrimental to existing service (Tr. 54).
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Mulcahy
v. Public Service Commission, supra, in addressing itself
to this point, said that present certificate holders should
be protected insofar as it can be done without injury to
the public. Certainly in this case protecting the existing
carriers will not produce injury to the public, but will,
in fact, protect the traveling public. In order to maintain
the standards of service now afforded the public by existing carriers the order of the commission granting a certificate should be reversed.
POINT IV.
THE COMMISSION HAS MADE FINDINGS OF FACT
BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO
UTAH LAW WHICH REQUIRES THE FINDINGS OF THE
COMMISSION TO BE BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDEN·CE.

The general rule on this point was clearly set forth
1n Dese.rt Turf Club v. Board of Sup'rs of Riverside
County, 296 P (2d) 882 (Calif.) (1956) at page 887:
"While adn1inistrative bodies are not expected
to observe meticulously all of the rules of evidence applicable to a court trial co1n1non sens~
and fair play djctate certain basic requiren1ents
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for conduct of any hearing at which facts are to
be determined. An1ong these are the following ...
hearsay evidence standing alone can have no
weight."
This principal is stated as the general rule in 43 AmJur
Public Utilities and Services sec. 219, where it is said
that a commission 1nay not base an order on incompetent
evidence. In 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities sec. 53, the rule is
noted that there must be sufficient competent evidence
in the record to support the commission's findings. The
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly subscribed to this
rule. See W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service Commission,
277 P (2d) 809 (1954; Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public
Service Comn~ission, 268 P (2d) 990 (1954); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 132 P (2d) 128
(1942); Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 117 P
(2d) 298 (1941).
In this record there is not a single shred of competent evidence on which a finding of a need for this
service could be based. No shipper witnesses were introduced by Welling. The entire body of evidence offered
by him concerning need for this service consisted of
hearsay statements by Welling of requests he claimed
had been made (Tr. 16 to 51). In paragraph two of the
Findings of Fact (Tr.lOO) the Commission acknowledged
that there was no competent evidence upon which to base
a finding of need when it stated that the only evidence
was applicant's testimony as to requests he had received.
Even after acknowledging this complete lack of compe-
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tent evidence of need, the Commission still granted a
certificate solely on the basis of the hearsay evidence,
admitted over protest. Such an action is a flagrant disregard of the controlling Utah law.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the action of the
Public Service Connnission in granting the certificate
of convenience and necessity to defendant Welling is
arbitrary and capricious and directly contrary to the
evidence. The Commission erred in failing to consider
the adequacy of services presently existing and in finding that the proposed service is merely an extension of
the current service. The grant of authority will adversely
affect plaintiff and other carriers which are currently
providing adequate service to the area. The finding of the
Commission that a need existed is based solely on hearsay evidence, which cannot form the basis of grant.
The order of the Cmnmission should be set aside.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
WOOD R. WORSLEY and SKEEN
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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